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WHEN CHARTER SCHOOLS CLOSE: 
LESSONS LEARNED IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
 
The South Carolina General Assembly passed the Charter School Act in 1996, 
creating the possibility of education options for parents and professionals through 
the chartering route. The first charter school in this state opened in August 1997. 
Experiences during the past twelve years have taught us many lessons about the 
charter school concept. Some of those lessons have led to revisions in the law or 
State Board of Education (SBE) regulations, while others have enlightened us about 
issues that force charter schools to close. To date, sixteen charter schools in South 
Carolina have closed—and for a variety of reasons. The South Carolina Department 
of Education (SCDE) has chosen to use the term “obsolete” to refer to these closed 
charter schools. 
 
As Robin Lake has written, “the success of the charter school movement will 
depend on whether it is able to build on successes and abandon failures. To 
reinforce success and eliminate failure, we need to understand what explains these 
variations” (Lake 2008, viii). Recognizing the need for such failing practices to be 
understood and abandoned in South Carolina, the SCDE offers in this essay the key 
points it has distilled from the information it has been able to amass. To arrive at 
these points, the SCDE examined a number of primary sources at length—
newspaper articles, personal communications with SCDE staff members, legal briefs 
prepared either by a charter school or its sponsor, and internal data generated by 
the Department. Sorting all of the information into a number of general categories, 
the SCDE then examined the specific patterns that emerged. 
 
After a brief overview of the statistical trends in the charter school closures, this 
essay focuses—in the section titled “Organizational Lessons for Charter 
Developers”—on the lessons that can be learned from the missteps of the state’s 
obsolete schools. Although changes in South Carolina charter school legislation and 
SBE regulations now prohibit some of the charter school practices described in this 
document (e.g., paid employees serving on a charter school governing board), all 
individuals involved with charter schools today can benefit from an understanding 
of the principles and the pitfalls described here.  
 
 
Overview in South Carolina 
 
The majority of the seventeen obsolete charter schools in South Carolina—eleven of 
them—did not survive past their second year. In fact, five of them closed at the end 
of their first year, and seven of them closed before the end of their second year. 
More than half of them closed between 2004 and 2009. With such a high rate of 
failure in the first two years, it is no surprise that the average operational time for 
South Carolina’s obsolete charter schools is only 2.6 years—a figure that highlights 
the difficulty of those early years in a charter school’s life and emphasizes the need 
for proper planning if a school is to survive. Three of these obsolete charters stand 
out as an anomaly in this trend, however: one remained open for nine years, 
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another for seven years, and one more for five years. The closure of those three 
schools beyond their first few years emphasizes the need for continuous vigilance in 
planning and management and reminds us that in the charter school reality, there 
never is a “safe time” to relax.  
 
Thirteen of the schools that became obsolete for a number of different reasons, but 
they closed in only two manners: district revocation or voluntarily relinquishment. 
(SCDE records do not clearly indicate how the other two schools closed, although it 
is believed that they were voluntary relinquishments.)  
 
Six of the schools had their charters revoked by the sponsoring district. District 
revocation is a process stipulated in the South Carolina Charter Schools Act 
(Chapter 40 of Title 59 of the South Carolina Code of Laws whereby a sponsor can 
terminate the remainder of a charter and thus force the school to close. According 
to Section 59-40-110(C), a charter can be revoked because the school has 
“committed a material violation” of its charter, “failed to . . . make reasonable 
progress, as defined in the charter application,” “failed to meet generally accepted 
standards of fiscal management,” or “violated any provision of law from which the 
charter school was not specifically exempted.” 
 
Eleven of the schools voluntarily relinquished their charter because they could see 
the insurmountable difficulties in continuing to operate. A voluntary relinquishment 
is a decision by the charter school’s governing board to end the life of the charter 
school. All of these governing boards cited at least one reason for their decision. 
Although in a few instances, the charter school board did not provide a written 
explanation of its rationale in voluntarily ending the charter, articles in the local 
newspapers do make the circumstances fairly clear.  
 
Many of these sixteen charter schools failed for multiple reasons. In fact, a total of 
twenty-two different causes are evident in letters from the local districts or the 
charter school boards or in newspaper accounts—reasons that vary widely from 
weak academics to financial difficulties. All of those reasons center either directly or 
indirectly in poor governance.  
 
The majority of the sixteen obsolete charter schools were located in the western 
part of South Carolina. Specifically, ten in the west have closed, four along the 
coast, and three in the midlands area. These statistics do not provide an easy 
answer as to why more schools have closed in the western part of the state. 
However, one possible explanation is the disproportionate number of charter 
schools that have appeared in that region: a total of fifty-four charter schools have 
been in operation at some point or another in the history of the charter school 
movement in South Carolina, and of those fifty, twenty-three were located in the 







Organizational Lessons for Charter Developer Groups  
 
Leadership Matters 
More than thirty years ago, the United States Senate’s Select Committee on Equal 
Educational Opportunity came to the conclusion that school principals are the 
central figures in producing the greatest success in education:  
In many ways the school principal is the most important and influential individual in 
any school. He or she is the person responsible for all activities that occur in and 
around the school building. It is the principal’s leadership that sets the tone of the 
school, the climate for teaching, the level of professionalism and morale of teachers, 
and the degree of concern for what students may or may not become. The principal 
is the main link between the community and the school, and the way he or she 
performs in this capacity largely determines the attitudes of parents and students 
about the school. If a school is a vibrant, innovative, child-centered place, if it has a 
reputation for excellence in teaching, if students are performing to the best of their 
ability, one can almost always point to the principal’s leadership as the key to 
success. (Quoted in Marzano, Waters, and McNulty 2005, 5–6) 
 
If the principal can be the reason for the success of a school, the converse is also 
true: the principal can be the cause of a schools failure. Charter planning 
committees, after they have been authorized by their sponsor, must find the right 
individual to lead the school. Often, charter committees will settle on a candidate 
just so they can fill the position quickly, and their hasty choice, unfortunately, can 
produce serious difficulties later. For the simple reason that, as Brian Carpenter 
puts it, “a capable executive is the single greatest variable that will determine the 
school’s success” (Carpenter 2008, 97), charter schools must resist the urge to hire 
a principal without utilizing a thorough interview and screening process. The biggest 
decision to be made by the charter committee, and later on governing board, is in 
hiring a capable leader to implement the mission of the charter school. 
 
As a charter committee or governing board begins to look for a school leader, it 
needs to focus closely on the qualifications of the individuals they are screening. If 
their process has not been a thorough one, the school will suffer. After all, as Peter 
Drucker has cautioned, “mediocrity in leadership shows up almost immediately” 
(Drucker 1992, 17). All charter school administrators need to possess skills that 
make them a hybridized combination of traditional school administrators and 
business leaders. There are qualified charter school leaders who come from 
business backgrounds, but as one administrator at an obsolete school is quoted by 
the local newspaper as having said, “operating a school and a business are two 
different things.” Teachers realize this crucial factor as well. One former teacher at 
an obsolete charter school explained its closure by saying that its teachers “didn’t 
feel the administration was equipped or prepared to deal with the school.”  
 
As charter committees or governing boards begin the process of hiring the school 
leader, they should clearly establish their criteria for the type of individual they 
want, clearly defining their expectations for a potential leader’s character and 
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abilities. Each school has specific needs, and there are leader characteristics that 
match those needs. Each charter school should therefore draft, in writing, what it 
wants to find in its leader. Chief among those desired qualities should be a high 
ethical standard. “Boards may be understanding about performance,” John Carver 
has asserted, “but should never bend an inch on integrity” (Carver 1997, 119).  
 
Listed in the chart below are a few characteristics and skills, by no means an 
exhaustive list, that charter committees or governing boards should seek. For the 
purposes of this document, a characteristic is considered a part of the leader’s 
personality, while a skill is something that can be learned over time. The board, in 
making its hiring decision, needs to prioritize the characteristics and/or skills they 
consider the most important and then not settle for anything less than their 
expectations. Charter school boards must also scrutinize a potential leader’s past by 
faithfully checking those references. One charter school board member told a 
reporter that they “made a big mistake by putting everything” in the hands of their 
leader. After this individual had been hired by the board, an important discovery 
was made (something that should have been known and considered before the 
person was actually hired): this person had been the leader of a charter school in 
another state that had faltered under the person’s leadership. 
 
 
Leadership Characteristics Leadership Skills 
Is people-oriented  Is mission-oriented 
Is willing to accept responsibility Translates complexity into simplicity 
Has demonstrated success in past 
positions Is comfortable in taking risks 
Was highly involved in previous 
organizations Is versatile and flexible 
Has intrinsic motivation Is thick-skinned 
Has business acumen Leads people instead of driving them 
Is self-aware of strengths and weaknesses Knows how to think 
Is results-focused, not glory-focused Is collaborative instead of competitive 
Has technical competence   
Is open to a challenge  
Has demonstrated high ethical standards 
in past positions  
 
 
One of the greatest challenges for charter school leadership is instability: constant 
turnover is a problem nationwide. As research has shown, “school leadership has a 
substantial effect on student achievement” (Marzano, Waters, and McNulty 2005, 
12). And if that leadership constantly changes, then an adverse impact on student 
performance is virtually certain to occur. Of the sixteen charter schools that have 
closed in South Carolina, one-third of them had more than two administrators in 
their two years of existence. Other factors, of course, were involved in these 
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administrative changes; however, the reality cannot be ignored that instability in 
leadership played a major role in the demise of these charter schools. One way to 
minimize the administrative turnover is to ensure that the governing board hires 
the correct individual. But the process does not end there. Those governing boards 
should perform annual evaluations so the school leader knows exactly what is 
expected of him or her.  
 
Boards Govern, Not Micro-Manage  
 
The governing body has to understand the compelling reason the charter school is 
to be formed; and if they do not, they create “the problem of having no meaningful 
benchmarks against which to assess the organization’s progress toward its purpose” 
(Carpenter 2008, 73). Never forget that receiving a charter is the ultimate in 
responsibility: the charter school is given autonomy in the daily decisions of the 
school but is held accountable for the results listed in the charter application. The 
charter school board must be able to prove its success and that only begins by 
focusing on the right elements. Good intentions are worthless if the exerted effort is 
not directed upon the right parcel to produce the desired results. 
 
To attain the goals and objectives stipulated in the charter, a charter school board 
must ensure they remain mission focused in every decision. For instance, one 
obsolete charter school had adopted a mission that would have carried it in a 
specific direction. However, after having had a succession of different 
administrators, the school hired an individual who asserted that he would take the 
school—to quote his own words—to the “leading edge of information systems 
technology.” The new curricular focus did not match with the original mission and 
was costly. Because the school was already accruing a large deficit, the decision to 
change the curriculum was made in the absolute worst possible time. It became the 
proverbial last nail in the school’s coffin. Of course, a charter school can change its 
mission, but this modification should only be made after much care and 
consideration (not to mention the fact that change must be approved by the 
sponsoring district). 
 
The charter school governing body’s most important action for the future of the 
school is hiring the school administrator. This decision can either make or break the 
school. For instance, one closed charter school offered a highly specialized 
curriculum and worked hard with their smaller number of students. After the 
founding principal left the school, a new principal who did not have a background in 
this highly specialized curriculum was hired; and after a year, the charter school 
closed. The board of that charter school had hired an individual who may have been 
highly qualified for the post, but that person was not the right choice for that 
particular mission. Because that individual did not match the mission of the school, 
the school was taken in a different direction—one that led to its closure. A teacher 
in a different school voiced agreement with that fact by saying that “with the right 
leadership, it could be an outstanding school.”  
 
Once the governing board has hired this administrator, they are not to be involved 
in the daily operation of the school. The administrator is given parameters within 
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which to operate in order to reach the goals and objectives of the mission created 
by the board. These parameters are created by board policies and the administrator 
then reports back on progress in meeting those goals. In the case of one obsolete 
school, the board actually began to run the school—performing teacher 
observations, making decisions about student discipline, and supervising the 
school’s administrative assistant. This level of micromanaging is unfortunate and 
completely wrong. If the board is doing the job of the administrator, whom they 
hired, how can they hold that individual accountable for their job performance? 
Also, if they are involved in these daily decisions, how can they focus on ensuring 
that the school is meeting the goals stated in their charter? The answer to both 
questions is they cannot. 
 
The Big Three Mistakes 
 
Charter school boards are susceptible to many shortcomings, just like the boards of 
any other nonprofit organization. However, mistakes made by charter schools often 
receive more publicity than those of other nonprofits. A big danger, especially in the 
charter school’s first few years, is what some people might call the “founders 
syndrome”: the typical scenario is that the individuals who wrote the charter and 
helped bring the plan to fruition decided to appoint themselves as the daily 
managers of the school. But often, one set of skills is necessary for the planning 
phase, and a different set of skills is needed for the implementation phase. 
 
One obsolete school exemplifies this situation perfectly: the chair of the planning 
committee set the salary of the school principal, without consent of the other 
committee members, and then appointed herself as principal of the school. With 
this one individual holding both the school executive position and the board chair 
position, she was able to maintain total control of the school and did not provide 
information to the other board members. Section 59-40-190(D) of the charter 
school act was not in the original version of the bill but has been added to address 
this very issue: “A member of a school governing body may not receive pay as an 
employee in the same school.” Legislators recognized that a charter school would 
be pursuing an unfortunate path without the separation of powers. Investing 
multiple positions with very different duties to one individual creates an opportunity 
for mismanagement that can, and often will, lead to the closure of a charter school. 
 
Another issue that arises for charter schools is objectivity: individuals serving on 
the board cannot divorce themselves from personal preference in making decisions 
that are in the best interest of the entire school. Typically, this situation arises 
when parents serve on the board because “they . . . appear to be focused more on 
their individual child’s needs and issues versus a parent collectively representing all 
parents at the school” (NRC 2008, 8).  
 
While this parent scenario is problematic, a more dangerous situation is when a 
partner with the school has a slot reserved on the board to represent the partner’s 
interest. The charter school is operated by a nonprofit board that, legally, makes all 
the governing decisions; and when those governing decisions are swayed by 
interested parties that contract with the school, problems can and will occur. 
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Individuals serving on charter school boards must neglect their personal or 
professional interests and focus upon the best decision for the entire charter school.  
 
The previously mentioned board mistakes can be highlighted by the example of one 
obsolete charter school. A consultant working for an organization that wished to 
partner with the eventual charter school wrote the charter and was appointed as 
the principal of the school and, quite possibly, also served as the board chair. The 
position offered to this individual was a reward for their diligent work on the 
application but created problems within the school. Also, the board of directors was 
comprised of 11 individuals: 3 parents, 3 teachers, 2 community members, and 3 
members from the partnering organization. This board composition creates some 
distinctive voting blocs—parents decide based on the best interest of their children 
and the partner members focus on their business relationship. While the application 
did not intend for problems to arise with board objectivity, it did occur. The board 
members from the partnering organization were from upper management; and 
when the partner provided financial resources and in-kind contributions, an image 
was presented that the partnering organization, in fact, ran the school. Whether 
this perception was accurate or not, objectivity was compromised. If a decision was 
in the best interest of the charter school, it could be challenged by those within the 
partnership if it cost their organization funding. 
 
The final area of concern for charter school boards is the practice of nepotism—the 
form of favoritism that one shows to his or her relatives. When the clear lines of 
separation are diminished in a charter school, real problems, not just perceptions, 
emerge. How does this scenario appear: the husband is the chair of the charter 
school board, the wife is the principal of the school, and their daughter is the lead 
teacher? Of course, lines of authority are crossed as the school sends a message 
that it is firmly entrenched in the family. Again, questions of objectivity arise, 
especially when an administrative decision is appealed to a board on which a family 
member of that administrator sits.  
 
The practice of nepotism and other forms of favoritism has been directly addressed 
by the South Carolina State Ethics Commission in its “Rules of Conduct” 
(http://www.ethics.sc.gov/rulesofconduct):  
 
 “A public official, public member, or public employee may not knowingly use his 
official office, membership, or employment to influence a government decision 
to obtain an economic interest for himself, a member of his immediate family, 
an individual with whom he is associated, or a business with which he is 
associated.”  
 “No public official, public member, or public employee may disclose confidential 
information gained as a result of his responsibility as a public official, public 
member, or public employee that would affect an economic interest held by 
himself, a member of his immediate family, an individual with whom he is 
associated, or a business with which he is associated.”  
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 “No person shall serve on the governing body of a state; county; municipal; or 
political subdivision, board, or commission and serve in a position of the same 
governing body which makes decisions affecting his economic interests.” 
 “No public official, public member, or public employee may cause the 
employment, appointment, promotion, transfer, or advancement of a family 
member to a state or local office or position in which the public official, public 
member, or public employee supervises or manages.” 
 
These ethical rules reveal the legislative intent of the South Carolina Ethics Reform 
Act (Chapter 13 of Title 8 of the S.C. Code of Laws) in that individuals on a public 
board must serve without personal or professional conflicts of interest. While not 
specifically naming charter schools, the principles enunciated by the Ethics 
Commission are directly applicable. For instance, charter school governing boards 
often provide salary increases or merit pay bonuses for their administrators; and if 
that principal is a family member of someone serving on the charter school board, 
they violate several of the Ethics Reform Act provisions. Thus, nepotism has no 
place in charter school boards. 
 
A charter school must strenuously seek to avoid each of the three mistakes 
described above if the best interests of its students are to be preserved. As a 
nonprofit organization, a charter school is created to serve a public interest—that is, 
it exists to fulfill a specifically identified need. Public dollars support these schools of 
choice, and taxpayers have the right to expect an ethical and conscientious 
stewardship of their investment. If a charter school allows any of these key 
mistakes to damage or distort its operation, it is in jeopardy of closing. And the 
result will be a loss not only of public monies but also of public confidence in the 
future of charter schools as a whole. 
 
Data Creates the Charter Plan 
 
As charter schools begin the planning process, they must examine all available 
information in selecting their proposed location. Brian Carpenter calls this data 
“your immediate external environment” and goes on to explain that charter 
developer groups must consider the demographic trends, competition factors, and 
authorizer relationships (Carpenter 2008, 101). A mistake often made by planning 
groups that open charter schools is a neglect of that “external environment.” Things 
inside and outside the organization are never static, so an eye must constantly be 
turned to what the data is showing. For instance, one obsolete charter school had 
been open for more than five years, with some decent academic results; however, 
it was forced to close. Why? Its teaching staff did not meet the requirements 
stipulated by federal legislation—specifically, the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act. 
This school had created a workable, multi-age classroom to meet the needs of its 
students, but when the external environment changed, the school had to make a 
choice: modify the internal environment accordingly or close its doors.  
 
A solid reference work for creating or modifying an organization is Lee Bolman and 
Terrence Deal’s Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and Leadership. Their 
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book postulates that every organization, whether in the initial stages of creation or 
in the process of being transformed, must be examined through four interrelated 
frames: the structural, human resource, political, and symbolic (Bolman and Deal 
1997, ix). If a charter development group relies upon only one source of data or 
framework in devising their plans, they inadvertently fall prey to the bias contained 
within that source. Every source has a premise or unstated purpose, and multiple 
sources will provide a more transparent picture.  
 
One teacher, speaking of the planning committee that opened a charter school that 
has since closed, made the comment that the charter school “went into something 
a lot faster than they were ready for.” The SBE—demonstrating the wisdom it 
gleaned from past charter school experience—passed guidelines that have been 
incorporated in Regulation 43-601 creating a year of planning for charter 
applicants. This full year of planning allows the school to gain a better idea of 
trends that may have been overlooked in their application, and the year also 
provides opportunities for the planning group to receive necessary training. 
  
Several obsolete charter schools were advised against opening due to declining 
enrollments and low community support yet chose to ignore that advice. One 
particular charter school that is now obsolete had decided to open in a place that 
had been experiencing several years of economic decline. As more and more 
parents left the area because of business closures, they took their children with 
them, and it became impossible for the charter school to survive financially. 
Speaking to a local newspaper reporter, a board member for that school expressed 
“disappointment at the community’s lack of support.” 
 
While it may be possible for a charter school to survive in an area with a declining 
population, financial or in-kind support from families and the business community 
must be forthcoming if the school is to succeed. Chester Finn and his coauthors 
have called such community support “social capital.” They go on to say that “a 
school lacking social capital is not likely to be a productive learning environment—
nor much of a community asset” (Finn, Manno, and Vanourek 2000, 222–23).  
 
Again, the charter school must consider multiple sources of data; and in the 
instance listed above, they did not do so ultimately leading to their demise. If data 
does not show enrollment or economic viability and that community support is 
lacking, then the best course of action may be for the charter planning committee 
to halt its progress. Continuing further, the charter school’s existence would cause 
parents and students to place their hope in this school only to have those hopes 
dashed as they watch it close later due to financial issues.  
 
Proper planning forces a charter developer group to examine various trends and 
collect data indicating support for the charter school. The CSAC has recognized the 
need for this information and evidence of support, so the actual charter application 
contains a section that requires the planning group to include this information 
within their charter. The information must show evidence that the charter school 
can and will meet its enrollment numbers which serves as the basis for the budget 
that is also contained within the application. If the threshold of support is 
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questionable, then the budget is suspect as well; and both combined, lead to 
questions of charter school viability. Opening a charter school, which is entrusted 
with public tax dollars, is no easy task; thus, any group planning to put forward a 
charter application must take the time to consider every viewpoint. 
 
This process of collecting data is not as simple as it may seem because the process 
involves more than just getting support or making budgets work. “It’s more a 
matter of knowing your market—call it market research—of segmenting your 
market, of looking at your service from the recipient’s point of view. You have to 
know what to sell, to whom to sell, and when to sell (Drucker 1992, 54). The 
demographic trends are a part of this process; however, the data alone provides no 
guarantees. The charter application must be detailed to match the trends revealed 
through the data. If the enrollment of an area is in general decline but an increase 
can be noted in special education children and the proposed charter school wants to 
target students with disabilities, then the school could be viable. A developer group 
can gather all the data in the world; but if they cannot write a plan to fit that data 
and attract students to the school, then the plan is worthless. A solid educational 
plan will produce data that demonstrates a need for the school, indicates how the 
school will address the identified need, and explains how the community has 
offered support for this proposal. If the created plan, based upon data, cannot 
generate community support, that proposal is doomed to fail. Data awareness goes 
much deeper than “knowing thyself” because the planning committee must know its 
challenges, constituents, customers, and criteria for success.  
 
Achievement is the Essence of Accountability 
 
Every charter school developer groups must collect its data in order to craft its 
educational plan, but the work does not end at that point. Performance goals and 
objectives must match the school’s mission and be based upon the data and the 
plan. These performance targets are the accountability to which the charter school, 
when opened, will be held accountable by the sponsoring district. Remember, South 
Carolina’s charter school legislation states that a charter application is a proposed 
contract with its authorizer; so when that document is approved by a district, the 
charter agrees to meets its goals and the district agrees to hold them accountable. 
If the charter school does not meet those targets as they promised, then the school 
can and should close—“This movement must hold itself accountable for refusing to 
accept mediocrity and failure. It should be its own toughest critic, its own best 
source of quality control” (Finn, Manno, and Vanourek 2000, 246).  
 
Five of the obsolete charter schools were directly revoked by their sponsoring 
district; and four of charter schools had academic concerns listed as part of the 
district rationale for revocation. While finances also played a part in those 
revocations, the two are specifically interrelated and, often, the two cannot be 
separated. If a school does not have the money it needs, then it cannot offer the 
program it promised in the charter application.  
 
In one instance, an obsolete charter schools appealed its district’s revocation 
decision and began to prepare its case. That governing board quickly discovered 
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that their approved goals were not measurable; so absence anecdotal evidence, the 
charter school could not document its academic success. This specific example 
reinforces the need for clear and measurable performance goals that are both 
challenging and reasonable. Charter schools are to have high expectations for their 
students and those expectations need to be reflected in the performance goals 
selected by the planning committee in the original application. If the charter school 
attains those goals, the governing body, in concert with its sponsor, should craft 
new performance goals. Unfortunately, “the great majority of major institutions 
that have gotten into real trouble over the last fifteen years are successes that 
rested on their laurels” (Drucker 1992, 66–67). Success cannot be a justification for 
relaxation but must instead be seen as an opportunity to refocus and continue to 
grow. Improvement is made by building off strengths; so a charter school should 
take its past successes as foundations for future greatness.  
 
Do not assume, however, that academic achievement is the “silver bullet” that will 
guarantee success for a charter school. High achievement is just one factor of a 
high quality charter school, and, if unaddressed, those other factors can be 
detrimental to the vitality of that school. An obsolete school that served a highly at-
risk students experienced enrollment growth and solid performance scores during 
its life. Clearly, the school had focused on academic achievement and exerted 
herculean efforts to ensure their children were learning. They did not keep an eye 
on their external environment, as suggested by Brian Carpenter, and issues arose 
that led to their closure. Those issues eventually seeped into the charter school 
creating division that not only led to academic decline but also to the eventual 
closure of the school. 
 
Finances Fan the Flame  
 
A school’s finances are the oxygen needed to fan the flames of what occurs within 
the instructional program. If the finances are abundant, the flame will be strong 
producing results in the school; however, if those finances are small, the impact 
within the classroom, and to the school as a whole, can be devastating. Even if 
student performance is solid, charter schools rise and fall on their finances; thus, 
extra care must be exercised by planning groups to ensure their financial 
projections are conservative and as close to reality as possible. Listen to how the 
two national experts on nonprofit management and governance summarize the 
need for any nonprofit, including charter schools, to ensure that its finances are 
sound and solid for it to have the opportunity to produce success:  
 
 “the program drives your budget, your budget doesn’t drive your program” 
(Carver 1997, 94) 
 
 “a non-profit institution that becomes a prisoner of money-raising is in serious 
trouble and in a serious identity crisis” (Drucker 1992, 56) 
 
Nationally known individuals speak of the importance of finances for nonprofit 
organizations (which charter schools are), and data from South Carolina’s obsolete 
schools also underscores that importance. Seven of the sixteen charter schools that 
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closed in the state (a rate of 40 percent) failed due to financial problems. Although 
not specifically mentioning finance, the governing boards of some of these schools 
made the decision to convert either to district-managed schools or independent 
private schools—decisions that imply financial problems. For instance, a charter 
school may have no choice but to lease a facility owned by its sponsoring district—a 
circumstance that strains an already-thin budget. However, if that charter school 
decided to terminate its charter and become one of the district’s schools, it could 
free itself from the financial burden of leasing the facility. If this scenario is an 
accurate one, finances have been involved in the closure of nine charter schools—




As charter developer groups begin the planning process, they should perform their 
due diligence to gather as much demographic information as possible with a specific 
focus on their proposed location. One obsolete charter school, with great intentions 
of helping revitalize its community, wanted to be located in a small, rural town with 
declining enrollments. Two years before the school closed, and during the summer 
preceding their opening, a board member stated in a local newspaper that “it’s 
going to be difficult because the enrollment is not great in that area anyway.” 
Knowledge of these enrollment problems should have been a red flag for the 
planning group. They, at that point, should have developed substantial contingency 
plans or halted progress on the application altogether. Never forget that student 
enrollment is the basis for the charter school’s funding; and when enrollment is 
scarce, the money will be likewise. Planning groups, through common sense, 
understand that budgets are built upon student enrollments; however, they charge 
ahead in planning when reality begs them to slow down their progress. 
 
Another piece to consider for realistic budgets is examining the educational 
program and staffing plans. These two areas are the most vital for a charter school 
to demonstrate success by attaining their selected performance measures. If a 
charter school proposes to serve a highly specialized population of students or offer 
a highly technical curriculum, those costs must be clearly demonstrated in the 
budgets. For instance, one closed charter school had declining enrollment and 
constant turnover in its administration. According to a local newspaper article, one 
principal wanted to put the school “on the leading edge of information systems 
technology.” While this idea certainly contains merit, is it possible in a school whose 
enrollment has dropped from 100 to 70 without cutting any of the 15 staff?  
 
Regarding school staffing, all budgets for charter schools must be realistic. One 
school, which projected to open with only 300 kids, established an administrator 
salary of $100,000. The highest salary paid to an administrator in that charter 
school’s sponsoring district was $83,600 for a school of 2,300 children. Clearly, that 
charter school’s selection of a salary was not reasonable and the situation was 
compounded when only 80 children arrived for the first day of school. This same 
school offered the following structure for 300 students: an executive director, a 
principal, a counselor, a “campus coordinator,” several administrative assistants, 
content department heads that taught only one class, classroom teachers, and 
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teacher assistants. That amount of staffing for a school of 300 is questionable for 
reality unless outside funding sources abound, especially considering the salary paid 
for the executive director of the school.  
 
If a school projects a 20:1 teacher-student ratio and hires 4 teachers to serve their 
80 children, is that realistic? Certainly, however, if those projected enrollment 
numbers do not arrive on the first day, adjustments must be made to the budget to 
prevent the accruement of a huge deficit. Even realistic budgets, when confronted 





When charter schools project their enrollment numbers in their initial budgets, they 
must proceed with due caution. If the enrollment figures are inflated too much, the 
school will be paid at that rate for the beginning of the year. Then, after the 45th 
day average daily membership (ADM) numbers are collected, the school’s funding 
will be adjusted accordingly. One charter school budgeted for 300 students, but 
only 80 students arrived the first day of school. Instead of notifying the district and 
immediately adjusting its budgets for these enrollment shortfalls, the school 
continued operation at the planned levels. As a result, the school spent $365,000 
that it should not have received from the district; and with its adjustment at the 
45th day, the school was in a situation that forced it to reimburse its sponsoring 
district. The school did not have the money to do so, however, and that huge deficit 
opened the door for many other problems eventually led to its revocation.  
 
A charter school is a public school and must exercise caution with the expenditure 
of public tax dollars. Charter schools must be proactive in addressing any budgetary 
shortfalls either through cutting costs or intense fundraising. The school in the 
example above did not reach their planned enrollment did not cut their costs but 
did continue to spend at the levels described in their approved charter. The school 
defended its actions by blaming the district for overpayment and stating that its 
officials did not know they were not due the money. This rhetoric continued for 
several months; and during these months, the school proceeded to operate without 
serious adjustments to their budgets. When the charter was finally revoked by the 
district, the charter school had accrued a deficit larger than $600,000. As bad as 
this South Carolina example may be, worse situations have occurred nationally—
and recently.A 
 
Another of these obsolete schools had 98 students enrolled at the time of their 
revocation but had prepared a budget for their third year based on 140 students. In 
their two years of operation, they had never held more than 138 students at any 
time, and that highest enrollment was on the day the school opened. Since its 
inception, the charter school had been losing students but refused to adjust their 
                                                 
A A principal in Ohio is currently serving a jail sentence for theft and record tampering at the charter school. As a 
public-funded institution, this charter school owes taxpayers more than $700,000. This entire situation began when 
the school claimed 135 more students than they actually enrolled, and that additional money was then utilized 
illegally (see http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20090402/NEWS01/304020011/0/TODAY). 
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operational budgets. Again, because charter schools receive public tax dollars, they 
must exercise proper stewardship of those funds and face the reality of those 
declining enrollments by cutting their budgets. Refusing to adjust a charter school 
budget—and thus creating large deficits that can lead to the eventual closure of the 
school—can have numerous, and often unforeseen, consequences: 
 Bad publicity in one charter school, unfortunately, becomes bad publicity for all 
charter schools. 
 The livelihoods of individuals are directly affected in a negative fashion. As the 
charter school continues to accrue debts and eventually closes, contractors who 
provided services to that charter school are left unpaid and are forced to absorb 
that financial loss jeopardizing their own financial standing.  
 The students transitioning into another school are the ones who suffer most: 
they are deprived of educational stability, they must adjust to a different 
curricular or instructional methodology, and they lose the connections they have 
made in the charter school. 
 School staff members lose their jobs and are forced to seek employment 
elsewhere—a situation that is especially problematic when a charter school 
closes midyear. 
 
Conservative Budget Action 
 
Charter schools must curtail well-intentioned actions to ensure that financial 
stability of the school may be maintained. Budget preparation for charter schools is 
based upon the amount of support that school receives, and this support includes 
parents that want to enroll their children as well as local businesses that wish to 
provide in-kind services or donations. As charter schools move from their planning 
phase actually into implementation, the governing board and administration must 
always keep an eye on the financial vitality of the school. This watchful eye will 
include making the difficult decisions to hold on to funds instead of dispersing them 
in a way that will make either the board or administration popular. Every financial 
decision must be made for the entire school’s benefit—staff and students—because 
one improper decision could cause the school to flirt with disaster. 
 
Often, charter schools have a fund balance at the conclusion of a fiscal year and 
may have the urge to do something special for their staff or students. These actions 
should be scrutinized to ensure they will not jeopardize the long-term future of the 
school. One charter school finished its first year with money remaining in the bank; 
however, their enrollment dropped sharply entering year two. Instead of adjusting 
their budgets for the shortfall and reporting those numbers to the district, the 
charter school continued its regular operation (including spending nearly $50,000 
for facility renovation) by over-reporting their numbers and provided each staff 
member with a $1300 Christmas bonus. These actions led to a $156,000 budget 
deficit, and the school closed at the end of the year. The charter school solicited 
advise from its sponsoring district about providing bonuses to their staff, and the 
district advised them to “wait . . . you may have a surplus now, but that does not 
mean you will have the same surplus next year.” Actions should be taken to 
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promote a positive working environment for the school, but those actions cannot 
and should not damage the school’s potential for remaining open. 
 
Know When to Fold  
 
The national charter school movement began in 1992, and it was marketed as the 
ultimate in accountability: “If a school succeeds, it can reasonably expect to get is 
charter renewed. . . . If it fails, it may be shut down” (Finn, Manno, and Vanourek 
2000, 16). While these closures are unfortunate events, if the school is not 
delivering on its academic promises or sees unavoidable financial shortfalls, it 
should close. Several of the obsolete charter schools refused to close and ran 
deficits of more than $250,000. And those stories were highly publicized. 
Journalistic reports have tended to create a poor image for the entire charter school 
movement, and therefore charter school board members need to consider the 
dynamics that come into play when they are considering the future of their school.  
 
Because charter schools are nonprofit corporations that purport to serve a public 
need and receive public funding, they should hold themselves accountable for the 
agreed-upon contract with their sponsoring district. The decision to close a charter 
school is what Brian Carpenter calls “the eighth out” (Carpenter 2008, 153). He 
makes a valid point in that charter schools work for the “preparedness of children 
for their own future.” And since many “charter schools serve a high percentage of 
disadvantaged minority students,” these nonprofit corporations should not have 
long, drawn-out battles for survival if they have not upheld their end of the 
contractual bargain. One South Carolina charter school that was conditionally 
authorized ran into this very debate. While one member of the board was saying 
that they were not given a fair chance for success, another board member made 
this rather telling statement, which was quoted in the local paper: “In essence, we 
did not live up to the agreement we signed with the school board.” As hard as the 
decision to quit may be, what is best for the children and what guards the sanctity 
of taxpayer dollars must always be considered. 
 
One obsolete charter school had served a rather small population of students in an 
economically depressed area. The school’s finances, with the low enrollment and 
state budget cuts, were in shambles. A portion of its considerable debt was 
graciously covered by another entity. Yet instead of reevaluating its position at this 
point, the school pressed forward in planning to open for its second year. The 
sponsor, upon learning of the school’s decision, voted to revoke its charter on the 
grounds that it had “failed to meet generally accepted standards of fiscal 
management” (Section 59-40-110(C)(3)). Rather than closing its doors, however, 
the school opened again in the fall but could not meet its enrollment projections 
and, as a result, accrued further debt. Finally facing the set of insurmountable 
difficulties it had created—a district revocation order, declining enrollment, 
increasing debt, and loss of community support—the school closed. 
 
Strongly underscoring the fact that charter schools must be disciplined enough to 
handle the flexibility they receive through state law, the story of this school’s 
demise is indeed a sad one for the school itself. Yet there are other victims as well. 
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With a pending revocation order, this charter school had decided to try to open 
school anyway, so it had made purchases in preparation for the coming school year. 
When the school closed, the various businesses that had sold it the merchandise 
were left with large, unpaid invoices and little understanding of the issues that had 
led to the school’s closure. Those businesses, immediately faced with their own 
financial shortfalls and the threat of their own closure, would certainly be less 
inclined to transact business with another charter school in the future.  
 
Clearly, if a charter school begins down the slippery slope to closure, it must halt 
such purchases until its leaders are certain it can survive financially. The decision to 
move onward in spite of everything hurts two key stakeholders: small businesses 
that cannot survive financial loss and other charter schools that are cast in a poor 
light because of one charter school’s irresponsible actions. Knowing when to fold is 
a critical ability both in poker play and in the operation of a charter school. 
 
The most direct victims of this charter school’s failure, however, are its students— 
who were forced to transition, during in the course of the school year, into their 
regular district schools. “Student mobility—students moving from one school to 
another for reasons other than being promoted to the next school level—is 
widespread in the United States,” Russell Rumberger has written. Going on to 
discuss “what schools and parents can do to mitigate the possible negative effects 
of changing schools,” he asserts that “much can and should be done both to 
prevent some types of mobility, especially those caused by school factors, and to 
mitigate some of the harmful effects from mobility” (Rumberger 2002, 1–3). 
Because charter schools exist to maximize a child’s educational opportunities, a 
charter school that is undergoing closure and yet fails to consider the time frame 
for student transition is totally ignoring, in Rumberger’s words, “the potentially 
harmful effects of mobility that may be necessary” (4). 
 
Decisions to close a charter school sometimes have nothing to do with performance 
or financial issues. For instance, one charter school representative wrote, in a letter 
to the sponsoring district, that the governing board had decided to close the school 
because of—in his words—a “continuing controversy over the charter school issue.” 
At that time, the sponsoring district and another charter school were involved in a 
dispute that was publicized in several detailed but contradictory reports. The school 
that closed had, unknowingly, applied Bolman and Deal’s political framework and 
had decided the risks it faced, in the given climate of the district, were too high for 
it to continue operating. In other circumstances, charter schools have agreed to 
give up their charter either to become private schools or to be absorbed by their 
local district. For instance, one charter school operated as an alternative school; 
and when legislation required every district to have an alternative school, the 
charter school agreed to end its charter and become a district-operated school. 
 
At some point, every obsolete charter school decided that enough was enough—but 
for very different reasons. While this topic may be unpleasant, charter schools can 
and do close regionally, nationally, and internationally. Once again, the closing of a 
charter school is part of the movement, and if a charter school decides it wants or 
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needs to discontinue its operation, the governing board must plan the process 
carefully. 
 
Section 59-40-120 of the charter school legislation says the following: “Upon 
dissolution of a charter school, its assets may not inure to the benefit of any private 
person. Any assets obtained through restricted agreements with a donor through 
awards, grants, or gifts must be returned to that entity. All other assets become 
property of the sponsor.” Because charter schools operate and receive grants or 
donations, they need to catalog what equipment, materials, or supplies were 
received as part of “restricted agreements” not only for audit purposes but also as 
preparation for the possibility that some day the charter will school close. If the 
charter school has received a federal planning and implementation grant, the assets 
obtained with that federal money will defer to the SCDE for redistribution to other 
charter schools. To reiterate, this document is not advocating morbid pessimism 
but seeks to prepare every planning group for realities they may face.  
 
The charter school movement arose out of three primary objectives: to provide 
education options for all school children, regardless of their socioeconomic status; 
to promote innovation within the education system; and to put the ultimate 
accountability for education results in the school itself—which means that if it 
cannot meet its stated goals, it closes its doors. Most decisions to close charter 
schools in South Carolina were related to fiscal issues. One school made two 
enlightening comments in its relinquishment letter to its sponsor: it had been 
“forced to seriously evaluate its potential to continue” and it had decided to close 
“in light of recent changes and other circumstances beyond our control.” When 
charter schools are in trouble, a point of critical mass will be reached, and the 
planning committees and/or boards need to decide for themselves when that point 
has been passed. To preserve, as much as possible, educational integrity for its 
students, the charter school cannot afford to delay the decision to close.  
 
The thought to close a charter school is an uncomfortable one and, typically, a 
divisive one. However, if the focus remains on what is best for the children, what 
must be pondered is the way to accomplish a smooth and swift transition from the 
charter school into the district school. Two of these sixteen closed charter schools in 
South Carolina shut their doors at midyear—a very disruptive event in a student’s 
education. If storm clouds are being noticed on the horizon, the governing body of 
the charter school needs to develop contingency plans for the benefit of that 
school’s students. Those contingency plans should include a provision where 
additional supplies and/or equipment are not purchased until the school has 
determined whether it will survive. If the school cannot survive but has purchased 
large amounts of supplies or equipment, then the company that provided those 
items will be left with a substantial loss. 
 
In a recent essay, John Witte and Stéphane Lavertu report six key findings on the 
impact that charter schools have had on student achievement in Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin. One of those findings—“student mobility has a negative effect on 
performance” (Witte and Lavertu 2009, 2)—applies directly to the effect that the 
closing of a charter school may have: as students move from school to school, their 
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relationships with the staff members at each successive school becomes more 
distanced and detached, and that lack of connection to a school’s culture and its 
staff ultimately comes to have a negative influence on the student’s academic 
performance.  
 
Opportunities for the Future  
 
The charter school movement has been described as “a seedling reform that grew 
into a robust tree, then a whole grove. The trees are still young, and the grove 
attracts plenty of lightning strikes, but it is steadily expanding” (Finn, Manno, and 
Vanourek 2000, 14). South Carolina’s charter schools fit the description of this 
pattern of growth well. Two years ago, South Carolina had 29 charter schools 
serving 5,400 children; but in this current year (2008–09), those numbers have 
grown to 36 charter schools serving over 9,000 children (a 64.6% increase). If the 
currently operating schools grow as planned and if the newly authorized schools do 
open, South Carolina could have more than 40 charter schools serving more than 
12,000 children within the next year.  
 
The demand for charter schools is clearly on the rise nationally as well as in South 
Carolina. As numbers of charter schools continue to proliferate, statistically, that 
indicates that more charter schools will also close. While South Carolina has seen 
15 charter schools close in a decade, other states have a much higher closure rate; 
and unfortunately, the nation has not seen the last charter school close its doors. 
The charter developer groups of today have an opportunity to learn from past 
experiences and thereby to prevent future failures. A charter developer from 
Massachusetts, providing advice for those who are pondering the charter school 
experience, has summarized the voyage nicely: 
 
Don’t pass up the opportunity. . . . I’m so glad I challenged myself to one last great 
adventure. Dream. Next, take time in the design phase to figure out what you want 
the school to look and be like. Take six months of staff development. Last, 
remember that charter schools are not built in a day. Tell parents that. There will be 
problems. It’s like the wagons going West. There’s treasure ahead, but dangers 
along the way. It’s been the adventure of a lifetime. (Quoted in Finn, Manno, and 
Vanourek 2000, 126) 
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SOUTH CAROLINA CLOSED CHARTER SCHOOLS 
  






DR = district revocation 
VR = voluntary relinquishment  
Abbeville 9 Abbeville August 2002 July 2004 
VR by governing board 
decision 
Bethune Charter 
School 7–12 Kershaw 
August 
1999 June 2001 
VR for low enrollment and 
financial difficulties 
Charles Aiken 
Academy 1–8  Greenville 
August 
1998 May 2007 
VR to convert to private 
school 
Children’s School 





VR to revert to regular 
public school 
Education 





DR for financial difficulties 
and academic concerns 
Elease Butler Ivy 
Academy K–5 Charleston 
August 
2003 June 2004 
DR for financial difficulties 
and governance concerns 
Harbor School for 
Arts and Sciences 4–8 Georgetown 
August 
1998 June 2000 
DR for financial difficulties 
and academic concerns 
Loop Charter 
School 1–4 McCormick 
August 
1998 June 2005 





9–12 Marlboro December 1997 
August 
1999 





9 McCormick August 2001 June 2005 





K–12 Greenville August 1997 
August 
1998 
VR to convert to private 
school 
Niven Center K–5 Greenville August 2005 May 2006 
VR by governing board 
decision 
Palmetto Charter 





VR due to financial and 
governance difficulties 
Restoring the 
Minds Math and 
Business Academy 
K–8 Greenville August 2005 
January 
2006 
DR for finance and 
academic concerns 
Sea Island 





DR for violation of state 
charter law and 
academics 
Susan G. Boykin 
Academy K-12 Charleston 
August 
2005 June 2010 
DR for financial difficulties 
and academic concerns 
Wohali Academy K-12 Greenville August 2004 
December 





6–12 SCPCSD August 2008 
August 
2009 
DR for financial reasons 







Bolman, Lee G., and Terrence E. Deal. 1997. Reframing Organizations: Artistry, 
Choice, and Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Carpenter, Brian L. 2008. The Seven Outs: Strategic Planning Made Easy for 
Charter Schools. Mt. Pleasant, MI: National Charter Schools Institute. 
 
Carver, John. 1997. Boards That Make a Difference: A New Design for Leadership in 
Nonprofit and Public Organizations. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. 
 
Drucker, Peter F. 1992. Managing the Non-Profit Organization: Principles and 
Practices. New York: HarperBusiness. 
 
Finn, Chester E., Bruno V. Manno, and Gregg Vanourek. 2000. Charter Schools in 
Action: Renewing Public Education. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Lake, Robin J., ed. 2008. Hopes, Fears, & Reality: A Balanced Look at American 
Charter Schools in 2008. Bothell, WA: Center on Reinventing Public 
Education, University of Washington Bothell. Available online at 
http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/view/csr_pubs/255 
 
Marzano, Robert J., Timothy Waters, and Brian A. McNulty. 2005. School Leadership 
That Works: From Research to Results. Alexandria, VA: Association for 
Supervision and Curriculum Development. 
 
NRC. 2008. Creating and Sustaining High-Quality Charter School Governing Boards: 
A Guide for State Policymakers. National Resource Center on Charter School 
Finance and Governance. 
http://www.charterresource.org/files/Governing_Board_v3.pdf. 
 
Rumberger, Russell W. 2002. “Student Mobility and Academic Achievement.” ERIC 






Witte, John, and Stéphane Lavertu. 2009. “The Impact of Milwaukee Charter 
Schools on Student Achievement.” Issues in Governance Studies 23 (March): 
1–10. Available online at 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/03_charter_lavertu_witte.asp  
